双语新闻：热钱困扰中国政府
Column: Hot Money Headache(7/7) Column: Hot Money Headache
By Lawrence J. Brainard
(Editor's Note: Mr. Brainard is chief economist at the research service Trusted Sources.)
It's becoming ever clearer that China's inflation problem is a monetary phenomenon after all, and not just a temporary spike in the prices of a couple food staples. But consensus on how to solve that monetary problem is still elusive. Beijing's adoption last week of administrative measures to combat speculative 'hot money' inflows shows policy makers still believe -- or perhaps simply hope -- that tightening regulation alone can do the trick. That may prove a costly mistake.
Consider the scale of the problem facing policy makers. Headline consumer price inflation has clocked in at or above 7.1% every month this year. Supply shocks for foods like pork play a role, but the fundamental problem is too much money pouring into the economy, chasing too few assets. One indicator of this is that China has recently been accumulating foreign assets at the astonishing rate of $75 billion a month.
Although some of this is a natural consequence of its trade surplus, much of it comes from a huge wave of hot money. During the first five months of this year an estimated $150-170 billion in hot money inflows have entered China, in addition to a trade surplus of $78 billion.
Understanding why and how this money is slipping past China's capital controls is the key to understanding which policy measures will be effective at slowing it, and which won't.
The starting point is the fact that since last October interest rate differentials between dollars and yuan have reversed. The U.S Federal Reserve aggressively lowered rates just as the Chinese central bank, the People's Bank of China, was pushing up domestic rates to fight inflation. Currently, rates on the Chinese central bank's one-year bills are about 170 basis points higher than comparable U.S. Treasuries.
This has created an arbitrage opportunity that local firms are exploiting on a massive scale, borrowing cheap dollars to substitute for more expensive borrowings in yuan and for local investments. A second factor driving this arbitrage is the wide-spread expectation that the government will either speed up the rise in the yuan's crawling peg or implement a one-off revaluation.
Evidence for these borrowings can be found in the sharp rise in domestic loans denominated in foreign currencies. In the 12 months ending in May, such loans increased by nearly $100 billion and now stand at $274 billion, lifting their year-on-year growth rate to 55%, from 12% growth the previous year. Such loans are routinely swapped into yuan to provide liquidity for local working capital and investments. This suggests that local banks are bringing in the dollars to fund such loans and that they have not encountered problems in doing so, at least so far.
Meantime, Chinese companies are hoarding their yuan in the bank. There has been a sustained rise in bank deposits of nonfinancial companies, despite real interest rates of negative 4% and tight caps on bank lending imposed by the central bank late last year. These factors would ordinarily be expected to force companies to draw down liquidity held in their $2.9 trillion in bank deposits. Indeed, there was a temporary dip in January, but this was quickly reversed. In the first five months enterprise deposits recorded a 23.3% annualized increase, compared with last year's 20% increase.
How big could this variant of the yuan carry trade become? Chinese firms face hordes of bankers eager to lend them cheap dollars both at home and abroad, so this arbitrage can take place in huge volume. And many ingenious avenues are available for getting the money in. In one example of how diverse the flows have become, copper ingots are reportedly being used as a vehicle to transfer funds via purchases for dollars on the London Metal Exchange which are then sold for yuan in Shanghai. Such creativity is limited only by the ability of the authorities to clamp down on these activities.
Such a crackdown is now underway. Last Wednesday, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange launched a new initiative to curb over-invoicing of exports and extended delays in making import payments, which are both ways to ramp up firms' domestic assets funded by short-term foreign debts.
While a determined tightening of capital controls will slow hot money inflows, the measure cannot stop them. Despite the existing controls on capital inflows, the recent surge of hot money inflows has developed with surprising ease. Any further controls, including last week's, are bound to fail because in a partially liberalized financial system such as China's, the markets will find a way around them. In the case of copper, incorrect invoicing, or any other avenue for inflows, it is impossible for the government to distinguish between speculation and essential purchases without shutting off the supplies China needs to maintain growth.
If corporate activity is the primary driver of hot money inflows, then the central bank faces an impossible task in keeping a lid on its growing financial bubble by using traditional levers like interest rate increases, or even adjustments to banks' reserve requirements. Interest rate increases that could make a difference are ruled out for fear of attracting even more hot money. This forces the central bank to rely solely on regular hikes in banks' reserve requirements and aggressive sterilization of currency inflows to manage liquidity. These moves are already running into diminishing returns as bank balance sheets are filled up with low-yielding paper. All these policies do is push up the cost of domestic credit, thus increasing incentives for firms to borrow even more from abroad.
Administrative measures will not solve the problem, though they may put off the day of judgment. If the rate of yuan appreciation steps up, to say 10%, then the hot money folks will take home the positive carry of some 1.5-2%, plus the appreciation. No wonder such inflows are exploding. This one-way option will persist until the yuan is substantially revalued or the Fed hikes interest rates and shrinks the interest differential.
This adventure sends a very simple message. Although China's currency policies have facilitated the country's integration into global trade flows, they do not provide an adequate framework for mediating the country's integration into global capital markets. China needs a better solution to this problem than more of the same administrative controls.
专栏：热钱困扰中国政府
--我们可以越来越清楚地看到，中国的通货膨胀问题总的来说是一种货币现象，而非仅仅是几种主要食品价格的临时性上涨。但人们对于应如何解决这个货币问题却仍是众说纷纭。中国政府上周决定以行政手段来抑制投机性“热钱”的流入，这说明决策者仍认为──或只是希望──加强监管就能够取得成效。但这可能会是一个代价不菲的错误。
让我们看看决策者所面临问题的严重程度。今年以来中国每个月的消费者价格指数都没低于过7.1%。这虽然一定程度上可归因于猪肉等食品的供应短缺，但根本问题却是太多的钱流入到经济领域，追逐太少的资产。其中一个指标是中国最近一直在以每月750亿美元这一令人吃惊的速度增持海外资产。
尽管这里面有贸易顺差的自然结果，但其中很大一部分是热钱掀起的波澜。据估计，今年前五个月，除了780亿美元的贸易顺差外，还有1,500亿至1,700亿美元的热钱进入到中国。
搞清楚这些热钱躲过资本控制闸门进入中国的原因和方式对了解哪些政策对减缓热钱流入有效，哪些政策不会有效果至关重要。
事情始于去年10月份以来美元与人民币利率差的逆转。美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)不断减息，而中国央行为了遏止通胀则在上调利率。目前，中国央行一年期债券的利率已经比同期美国国债高出约170个基点。
这带来了套利的机会，本地企业大规模借入低成本的美元，替代利率较高的人民币投在国内。推动这种套利的第二个因素是人们普遍预计政府将加快人民币升值步伐，或是对人民币币值进行一次性重估。
这类贷款可以从国内外币贷款的大幅增加中找到证据。在截至5月份的12个月中，此类贷款增加了近1,000亿美元，目前为2,740亿美元，一年时间增长了55%，高于上一年12%的增幅。这类贷款通常会兑换为人民币用于在本地的营运资本和投资。这表明当地银行正在筹集美元以发放此类贷款。至少就目前而言，他们的这一做法还没有遇到问题。
与此同时，中国公司正在银行中囤积人民币。非金融企业在银行中的存款持续增长，尽管实际利率达到了-4%，而且央行在去年底对银行贷款实行了严格的限制。这些因素通常被认为会导致国内企业约为2.9万亿美元的银行存款出现下降。实际上，1月份时也的确出现了暂时的下降，但这种情况很快就发生了逆转。今年前5个月，企业存款折合成年率创出了23.3%的历史增长纪录，而去年的增幅为20%。
这种人民币融资套利交易的规模有多大？中国企业会遇到很多愿意在国内外向它们提供低成本美元贷款的银行，因此这种套利的金额会很大。而且有许多独特的渠道可以让这些资金进入国内。这种流入的渠道五花八门，比如，据报导铜锭就被用作资金转移的工具，在伦敦金属交易所以美元购买铜锭后再在上海以人民币卖出。这种创意能发挥到何种程度取决于政府打击这类活动的能力。
这种打击目前还在进行之中。上周三，中国国家外汇管理局推出了新的举措，加强对企业出口预收货款和进口延期付款的管理。这两种办法都是通过短期外债来增加企业的国内资产。
尽管果断加强资本控制会减缓热钱的流入，但这一措施却无法彻底阻止热钱。虽然目前对资本流入采取了不少控制手段，但热钱仍在轻松地继续大量涌入。包括上周的措施在内，任何未来的控制手段还会以失败告终，因为在中国这样一个部分开放的金融体系内，市场终将会找到绕过这些手段的办法。比如在铜锭、预收货款或其它资本流入通道的案例中，政府不可能在不切断这些供应的基础上分清投机与实际购买之间的区别。
如果企业的活动是热钱流入的主要推动力，那么央行想通过加息或调整存款准备金率等传统杠杆控制金融泡沫就是一个不可能完成的任务。由于担心会吸引更多的热钱，加息选择已经被排除在外。这迫使央行只能依赖例行上调银行存款准备金率，大力吸纳流入的外汇，以控制流动性。此种举措导致银行的资产负债表中充斥了大量低收益率票据，其效力也日益降低。这些政策的全部结果就是推高了国内借贷的成本，进而增加了企业进一步从海外借贷的动力。
行政手段无法解决这一问题，尽管它们可能会推迟做出判断的日期。如果人民币升值幅度加大，比如达到10%，那么这些热钱带回它们国内的将是1.5-2%左右的套利，外加人民币升值带来的收益。无疑热钱的流入在爆炸性增长。这种单向式的资金流动将一直持续到人民币大幅重估或Fed上调利率，导致息差减小后为止。
这种冒险做法传递了一个非常简单的讯息。尽管中国的外汇政策促进了中国与全球贸易活动的融合，但却未能为中国融入全球资本市场提供恰当的框架。对这个问题，中国需要有更好的解决方案，而非一再使用行政控制手段。
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